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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4264 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JERRY L. STRAIN, 
                 Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 09-cr-291) 
District Judge:  Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2012 
 
Before:   SCIRICA, FISHER, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 16, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Jerry L. Strain appeals a sentence imposed by the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  He had received a variance when he was originally 
sentenced but not when the District Court later amended his sentence to reflect a 
retroactive change to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  In his view, the denial of 
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a variance in the amended sentence constitutes error.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I. Background 
In December 2009, Strain pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  At 
sentencing, the pertinent Guidelines range was determined to be 108 to 135 months’ 
imprisonment.  Strain moved for a downward variance from this range, and, after 
analyzing the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court granted that motion and 
sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment (approximately a 17 percent variance below 
the minimum of 108 months), followed by three years of supervised release.   
As a result of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, the Guidelines ranges for crack 
offenses were reduced to lessen the disparity between those offenses and offenses 
involving powder cocaine.  See Amendment 750, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines app. C, at 
392–93 (2011).  Those changes were made retroactive on November 1, 2011.  U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.10(c) .  In light of the retroactivity of 
the amendments, Strain filed a motion to reduce his sentence.  Without opposition from 
the government (App. at 102), the District Court granted Strain’s motion and his 
amended Guidelines range became 70 to 90 months’ imprisonment.  Strain also asked the 
District Court to grant a 17 percent variance, as the Court had in imposing the initial 
sentence.  The Court rejected that request, citing Guidelines § 1B1.10, which prevents 
courts from departing or varying after re-sentencing a defendant pursuant to an amended 
Guidelines range except to reflect substantial assistance.  Id. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).  The 
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District Court sentenced Strain to 70 months’ imprisonment, which was the minimum 
recommended under the amended range.  Strain filed this timely appeal, contending that 
the District Court’s reliance on § 1B1.10 was in error. 
II. Discussion1
Section 1B1.10 of the Guidelines provides, “[T]he court shall not reduce the 
defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement 
to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range … .”  Id. 
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).  Strain argues that the United States Sentencing Commission (the 
“Commission”) lacked the authority to promulgate § 1B1.10 because that provision 
impermissibly interferes with aspects of an original sentence, such as the propriety of a 
variance.  Strain further argues that adoption of §1B1.10 violates separation of powers 
principles because it “constitutes unconstrained rule making and interferes with the 
judicial function.”  (Appellant Br. 12.)  Both arguments are unavailing.  
 
We recently addressed those same arguments in United States v. Berberena, No. 
11-4540, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 3937666 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2012).  In Berberena, we first 
considered the issue of the Commission’s authority to promulgate § 1B1.10 and indicated 
that the Commission had authority to limit variances in light of three statutory provisions: 
28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a) and (u), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Id. at *3-4.  We explained that 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.  United States v. 
Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review for clear error any factual 
findings that support a sentencing determination.  Id. 
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“§ 994(u) requires the Commission to specify [by what amount sentences may be reduced 
based on retroactive amendments], § 994(a)(2)(C) requires that this specification be in 
the form of a policy statement, and § 3582(c)(2) makes those policy statements binding.”  
Id. at *5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, “these 
provisions sink [Strain’s] contention that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority 
by prohibiting courts from reducing a prisoner’s sentence below his amended Guidelines 
range except to reflect substantial assistance.”  Id.  
 As to Strain’s separation of powers argument, our opinion in Berberena explained 
that Congress’s delegation of authority to the Commission did not violate separation of 
powers principles because “a delegation of legislative power is permissible if Congress 
‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.’”  Id. at *6 
(alteration in original) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).  
And given the clarity of §§ 994 (a) and (u), and § 3582 (c)(2), the “intelligible principle” 
requirement “easily has been met here.”  Id.2
As a result of our rejection in Berberena of the same arguments that Strain presses 
here, his appeal lacks merit. 
  
                                              
 2 To be sure, Berberena explained that the Sentencing Commission’s revision of 
§ 1B1.10(b) did constrain the ability of courts entertaining § 3582(c)(2) motions to 
reduce sentences.  Yet, it did not impermissibly interfere with the judicial function and 
comported with separation of powers principles.  Cf. Berberena, 2012 WL 3937666, at 
*8 (“Congress explicitly placed the Commission within the judicial branch because of the 
role that branch has historically played in sentencing.”). 
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III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District 
Court. 
